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Baby Steps Toward International Fair Labor Standards:
Evaluating the Child Labor Deterrence Act
I. INTRODUCTION
Newspaper reports of child labor abuses lead with misery: in Thailand,
weeping, malnourished children squint at daylight, clinging to the legs
of the Bangkok policemen who are raiding the paper cup sweatshop
where the youngsters work.' In Mexico, twelve-year-old Vincent Guer-
rero, the smartest of 105 sixth-graders, wins a speech contest at his
school. That evening, Vincent's father is proud to announce that school
is over for Vincent for good. Now the boy will work full time, spreading
toxic toluene glue on the soles of athletic shoes, with his bare hands.
Within weeks Vincent is home in bed, coughing, with burning eyes and
nausea.
2
The reports explain that tradition, economic pressure and evil bosses
are to blame.3 Some of the children even say they want to work.' The
practitioners are complacent. There are numerous laws against employ-
ing children, and reports of abuses outrage the newspaper readers, but
child labor thrives.' The bans are rarely enforced.
I Uli Schmetzer, Children: Modern-day Serfs in Asia's Merciless Sweatshops, CHI. TRm., Nov.
18, 1991, at 1.
2 Matt Moffett, Working Children: Underage Laborers Fill Mexican Factories, Stir US. Trade
Debate, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1991, at 1.
3 For example, Indian labor union spokesperson Swami Agnivesh stated that child labor legis-
lation was passed but not implemented due to lack of "political and judicial will." Over 55 million
child laborers in India Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Feb. 15, 1991, item no. 0215170
available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
Paul Ames, Child Abuse Cases Shock the Portuguese, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992, at A23, ("Por-
tugal is estimated to have the highest child labor rate in Western Europe," 200,000 children working
in construction or in textile and shoe factories); Red Star Falling, MAcLEAN's, Dec. 30, 1991, at 12
(with the rise of capitalism in Russia, child labor, which was unheard of under Communist rule, is
starting to be seen.).
4 Moffett, supra note 2.
5 The International Labor Organization reports that there are 88 million working children, 67
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The proponents of the Child Labor Deterrence Act (CLDA) argue
that this market for child labor in other countries is not simply a sorry
fact of life.6 The U.S., they say, can restrict use of child labor abroad by
eliminating the U.S. market for the goods the children make.7 To manage
this the CLDA would target American importers, penalizing those who
attempted to bring such goods through customs.' By implication, the
proponents of the CLDA also assert that such action would be legal
under international law.
In remarks introducing the CLDA, Congressman Donald Pease (D-
Ohio) invoked the newspaper stories and mourned the wasted potential
of each young Vincent Guerro.9 Indeed, the CLDA he proposes would
require further published periodic reports to identify countries that use
and abuse child labor. The disturbing news reports could then be written
by the United States.
Congressman Pease, however, made only passing reference to the
issues of the effectiveness of the bill and of existing U.S. international
obligations. How will U.S. treaty obligations and generally accepted prin-
ciples of international law restrict the U.S. if it attempts to enforce a bill
with the extraterritorial effects of the Child Labor Deterrence Act? Will
the CLDA, if it is legal under international law, actually affect the use of
child labor abroad? Or will it only mean more sad stories?
A brief history of U.S. domestic and international child labor
prohibitions will place the Child Labor Deterrence Act in context. The
United States tried and failed to establish international fair labor stan-
dards within the multilateral framework of the GATT. That failure pro-
million of these in Asia. The figures do not include children less than 10 years old. Mahesh Uniyal,
Asia: Child Labor Still a Regional Tragedy, INT'L PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 8, 1991.
Even in the U.S., child labor violations continue. The General Accounting Office Director of
Education and Employment Issues reported that between 1983 and 1989 violations of child labor
laws increased 250%. Linda Golodner, The Children of Today's Sweatshops, 21 Bus. & Soc'Y REV.
51, 52 (1989). See also Child Labour in the World Today, UNESCO COURIER, Oct. 1991, at 37.
6 The Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1991, H.R. 3786, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); The
Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1990, S. 2698, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990); The Child Labor Deter-
rence Act of 1989, H.R. 2485, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); 137 CONG. REC. E3860 (daily ed. Nov.
15, 1991) (Introduction of H.R. 3786, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess, by Congressman Donald J. Pease).
7 Specifically, export goods manufactured or mined by children less than fifteen years old. H.R.
3786, supra note 6 at §§ 2(c), 8(a)(7). See also 137 CONG. REC. E3861 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1991)
(Congressman Donald J. Pease, introducing H.R. 3786, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., stated that, "child
labor cannot practically be eradicated overnight. Rather priority should go in the near-term to stop-
ping the most egregious forms of exploitation of children in the workplace around the world. In our
opinion, the widest possible international consensus can be mobilized around the proposition that
children under fifteen should not be allowed to work in industry or mining. This approach would
prevent younger children from being put to work in occupations where they would be in the greatest
danger of traumatic injury or occupational disease.").
8 H.R. 3786, supra note 6 at § 6.
9 137 CONG. REC. E3860 supra note 6, at E 3860.
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voked the U.S. to unilaterally demand workers' rights, pressing for
international fair labor standards in nonreciprocal grant programs and
extraterritorially applied domestic legislation. These bolder attempts at
change, however, have rarely been used to reform international child la-
bor laws. This continued lack of success has prompted the CLDA.
The CLDA will be evaluated in terms of effects on existing interna-
tional agreements, American workers, American importers, and foreign
children. International resistance to child labor reform persists, but the
CLDA seems to have been drafted with that resistance in mind. The bill
could be a valuable first step toward general agreement on international
fair labor standards.
II. MINIMUM AGE: ASSERTING INTERNATIONAL FAIR LABOR
STANTANDARDS
Congress and the President share constitutional foreign trade pow-
ers. The President negotiates foreign trade agreements, 10 while the Con-
gress regulates commerce with foreign nations.' The U.S. trade policy
that emerges from this shared power can be focused and consistent when
the branches cooperate closely. Congress does, at times, simply ratify a
course set by the President and his appointee, the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive (USTR).12 Absent that cooperation, foreign trade policy can be a
tug-of-war, with the President and Congress often at odds over how to
soothe interest groups, implement party platforms, and maintain interna-
tional alliances. 1
3
Both branches have agreed on the need for enforceable international
fair labor standards, and presidents have sought to include them in trade
agreements for many years.1 4 International fair labor standards are the
minimum rights of workers, distinguished from domestic standards of
any one country; a "benchmark" applicable to all countries.15 Those in-
ternational standards, as recognized by the United States, are:
1. the right of association,
2. the right to organize and bargain collectively,
10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
11 Id. art. I, § 8.
12 RAYMOND VERNON & DEBRA L. SPAR, BEYOND GLOBALISM: REMAKING AMERICAN
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 54-55 (1989); The Office of the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) is a cabinet post first established as the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations in the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 241, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872, 878 (1962). The USTR's
duties were broadened and codified in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1988)).
13 VERNON & SPAR, supra note 12, at 25-27.
14 Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading
Regime, 126 INT'L LAB. REV. 565, 565-69 (1987).
15 Id. at 569.
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3. the prohibition of compulsory or forced labor,
4. a minimum age for the employment of children, and
5. acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages,
hours of work, and occupational safety and health. 16
Since Eisenhower, American presidents have backed the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the vehicle for these fair
labor standards.17 The GATT is the multilateral agreement that has be-
come the dominant international trade institution." Fair labor standards
accepted as a provision of the GATT could ensure fair competition be-
cause they could be universally applied.19
The executive has failed, however, to win agreement on any of the
basic international fair labor standards. With the CLDA, Congress
would force the executive to assert the fourth of the international stan-
dards listed above, outside the GATT framework, whether other nations
liked it or not.2 0
III. HISTORY
From the start, proponents of international minimum age standards
for workers have backed multilateral agreements because the best inten-
tions of private reformers can be undercut by the realities of competition.
For example, as early as 1850, in Belgium, textile manufacturers and
mine managers decided among themselves to prohibit the use of child
labor in their own plants.21 Without laws to force their competitors to
16 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4)(1992); Fair Labor Standards for World Trade, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Nov. 1967, at 27, 27-30 (discussing the meaning of "fair labor standards" in international
trade).
17 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
pt. 5 A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]; Proclamation No. 2761A, 12 Fed. Reg. 8863 (1947)
(the United States participates in GATT through executive agreement).
The GATT is one answer to the basic conflict among nations between the desire for free trade
on the one hand, and, on the other, the fact that pure free trade benefits are in the aggregate. The
savings when tariffs are abolished are realized only on a world scope, meaning various domestic
losers will therefore resist. The GATT reduces uncertainty for these potential losers with its Most
Favored Nation designation, by which all parties to the GATT enjoy the same low tariff rates each
nation applies to its most favored trade partner.
Eisenhower suggested fair labor standards be added to the United States' Reciprocal Trade
Agreements in his first State of the Union speech. N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1953, at 14. The State
Department followed that same year with a proposal for an unfair labor clause in the GATT. Steve
Charnovitz, Fair Labor Standards and International Trade, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 61, 64 (1986)
[hereinafter Fair Labor.]
18 KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATINOAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
10, 17 (1970).
19 GATT, supra note 17.
20 H.R. 3786, supra note 6 at § 2(b).
21 Ernest Mahaim, The Principles of International Labor Legislation 166 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 10 (1933).
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observe the same prohibitions, however, the reformers could not afford to
maintain their new standards.22 These reformers did not want their good
will rendered worthless by a minority of self-interested producers who
ignored the new minimum age, and hired children for the savings in wage
costs.
23
A. The U.S. Crusade
Tension between American reform and economic interests illus-
trates the problem at the domestic level. After the Civil War, manufac-
turing meant jobs for many poor farmers and sharecroppers in the
southern states, and sometimes for their children z.2 The hopes of the old
southern aristocracy were revived when manufacturing promised to re-
habilitate the region and maintain white supremacy. 25 Businessmen in
these states competed with the North much as the less developed coun-
tries compete with industrial giants in the twentieth century; by exploit-
ing cheap labor.26 Northern competitors complained that the South was
profiting unfairly, and that southern producers should copy the North's
progressive child labor prohibitions, but the South resisted. The mill
owners and the mine managers, who hired "breaker boys" ten and eleven
years old to work deep in the shaft, had their principal competitive ad-
vantage in low wage costs. 28 Trumpeting the Puritan ethic, preaching the
virtues of work, southern states claimed their right to legislate such ques-
tions without outside interference. 29 Cotton mill owners called them-
selves benevolent for employing children as young as eight years old; the
owners were supposed saviors to families otherwise in the poorhouse.30
Economic self interest might have motivated employers to resist
child labor reform indefinitely had the American crusade not been forti-
fied by community outrage. Muckraking journalists exposed the oppres-
sion of young children in the workplace.31 Photographs could now be
used to document - and to shock.32 Citizens who are already convinced
need only inspiration to turn that conviction into action, into cash contri-
22 I at 11.
23 Id.
24 JAMES C. COBB, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOUTHERN SOCIETY, 1877-1984, 68 (1984).
25 STEPHEN WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 7 (1968) (the
southern factory masters and financiers composing the "new oligarchy" were the same community
leaders who formed the antebellum plantation aristocracy).
26 Id. at 7-8.
27 COBB, supra note 24, at 72.
28 NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITrEE, THE LONG ROAD 12 (1944).
29 Id
30 Id.
31 See generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
32 See, eg., CONSUMER'S LEAGUE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CHILDREN WHO WORK IN
THE TENEMENTS (1908).
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butions, and into votes. Church groups and the National Child Labor
Committee were incensed and willing to fight.33
The early federal bans won by these reformers were declared uncon-
stitutional. In Europe, international conventions to ban child labor were
signed in 1919. 31 In the United States, a 1918 Supreme Court decision
still denied Congress the power to regulate child labor among the states,
because the commerce clause was not the proper means to such an end.35
Attempts to control child labor through the power to tax were struck
down as well, in 1922.36
The crusaders countered with a constitutional amendment that
would have given Congress the power to set a minimum age for employ-
ment.37 Interpreting the amendment as one which would interfere with
states' and parental rights, the opposition southern textile producers and
the National Association of Manufacturers successfully opposed the
measure in twenty-two states.38 After more than twenty years of debate,
economic interests could still successfully resist child labor reform.
It was 1938 before Congress passed minimum age requirements in
the Fair Labor Standards Act, setting the U.S. minimum age for labor in
industry and mining at 16, and another three years before the legislation
33 WOOD, supra note 25, at 10.
34 Alice Cheney, A Comparison of Convention Provisions with Labor Legislation in the United
States 166 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 176, 178-183 (1933).
35 "The act in its effect does not regulate transportation among the states," wrote the court,
"but aims to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing
within the states. The goods shipped are of themselves harmless." Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251, 258 (1918) overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
36 Though Justice Holmes would have upheld Congress' attempt in Hammer, even he sided
with the majority that struck down Congress' use of the taxing power to regulate the minimum
working age in the Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (Justice Holmes stated, "if there is any
matter upon which civilized countries have agreed - far more unanimously than they have with
regard to intoxicants and some other matters over which this country is now emotionally aroused - it
is the evil of premature and excessive child labor." Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. at 280 (Holimes,
J., dissenting)).
37 H.R.J. Res. 184, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). The proposed amendment read:
SECTION 1. The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor
of persons under 18 years of age.
SECTION 2. The power of the several states is unimpaired by this article except that
the operation of state laws shall be suspended to the extent necessary to give effect to
legislation enacted by the Congress.
38 68 CONG. REc. 7166 (1924) (statement of Rep. Pou); id. at 5315 (statement of Rep. Mc-
Swain), ("there will be the same regulations for the truckers of New England and the ranchers of
Texas. It is therefore manifest that what will suit the people of one State and of one section must be
unsuited to the people of another State and of another section.").
The National Association of Manufacturers wanted to lower the maximum compulsory educa-
tion age to 14 years to accommodate "mentally inferior children" who would not profit from further
education. NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at 22.
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was finally upheld by the courts.39
B. Early International Enforcement
The Belgian industries and U.S. reformers discussed above called for
minimum age standards and other worker protections within their own
countries. At the same time citizens of many nations began calling for
standards on the international level.40 The early initiatives for interna-
tional labor legislation surprisingly did not come from workers because
labor laws generally prevented their right to organize.4 1 Instead, the im-
petus came from entrepreneurs, managers, administrators and physi-
cians. Their motives were, first, humanitarian, second, political (on the
grounds that workers rights would prevent social upheaval), and, third,
economic; industrialists remained concerned that any worker protections
not enforced throughout their industry would put them at a competitive
disadvantage.42
The 1906 Berne Convention to prohibit the use of white phosphorus
in the match industry was typical of the first international labor conven-
tions - small triumphs after years of work, gauged to some pressing
need, and not internationally enforceable.43 In 1908, after two years of
discussion at Berne, the members of the Convention finally succeeded in
reaching agreement on banning the use of dangerous white phosphorus,
and prohibiting night work by women.' The Berne Convention had no
organizational mechanism, no penalties beyond limited peer disapproval,
and, once it appeared that it would actually be signed by only a small
group of committed nations, it came to be seen merely as a means to
promote further legislation in separate nations.45
The Berne convention is nevertheless significant. European market
39 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1938), upheld in United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941). 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1938) (oppressive child labor and the minimum age require-
ments for workers are defined).
40 VicToR-YvEs GHEBALI, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION: A CASE STUDY
ON THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. SPECIALISED AGENCIES 2-3 (1989). See also GEORGE N. BARNES,
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE 28-37 (1926).
41 GHEBALI, supra note 40 at 2.
42 .d at 3.
43 Fair Labor supra note 17, at 62.
44 An exploratory diplomatic labor conference at Berlin in March, 1890 agreed only on resolu-
tions regarding the dangerous matches. The Congress of Labor Legislation in Brussels in 1897 led to
the International Association for Labor Legislation in 1900. The United States did not sign.
GHEBALI, supra note 40 at 5.
45 Mahaim, supra note 21, at 11. Only one of the six nations that signed the ban on white
phosphorus even used the substance. Only nine of twelve signatory states to the female night work
ban actually agreed to prohibit it in any way, and the standards for regulation of such work varied
widely from country to country, depending on existing domestic laws. The conventions were later
endorsed by ILO conventions 4 and 7.
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forces had not cured the problem of unsafe white phosphorus. Like re-
ports of child labor abuse, white phosphorus publicity brought outrage
over the suffering of afflicted workers. Fear for loved ones in similar
situations tipped the scale.46 Even in the United States, though no Amer-
ican companies produced these matches, there was great American inter-
est in the danger they posed.4' This international concern for the victims
of an arguably cost efficient business practice mirrors the outrage that at
least partially fuels American child labor campaigns today.48
In 1912, Congress answered domestic concerns with the first U.S.
trade law intended to protect the health of foreign workers. In an import
tax hike that, while not expressly banning the white phosphorus matches,
effectively eliminated their U.S. market, the U.S. accomplished the same
goal other nations had addressed through strict prohibitions.49 The U.S.
tax legislation made it easier for other manufacturing countries to sign
the Berne Convention; those nations would have suffered economic dis-
advantage in switching to safer, more expensive materials had the U.S.
market remained to tempt the unscrupulous manufacturer."0
C. The ILO After the First World War
Popular pressure for workplace safety and other worker rights grew
following World War ."1 Workers were organizing. The class collabora-
tion that drove the war efforts fostered minimum wage laws and worker-
employer committees during World War I.2 After the war, trade unions
enjoyed new strength and respect. They demanded worker rights, and
institutions to implement them, in the Armistice treaties.5 3
In 1919, as part of the war's settlement, the International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO) was created, providing for universal application of
worker standards and "tripartite" participation by workers, government,
46 James Meyers, American Relations with the International Labor Office, 1919-1932, 166 AN-
NALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 136 (1933).
47 Id. at 137.
48 The concern for foreign match workers indeed mirrored the support for U.S. child labor
prohibitions at the time, but the opposition to child labor focused on the need for domestic laws, not
international conventions. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
49 Act Providing for a Tax on White Phosphorus Matches and for Prohibiting their Import or
Export, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4801-4805 (1970) (repealed 1976.) (original version at Ch. 75, §§ 1-17, 37
Stat. 81 (1912)). Cf. The CLDA would dry up the U.S market for foreign goods made with child
labor by means of a complete prohibition and accompanying penalties. H.R. 3786, supra note 6.
50 Meyers, supra note 46, at 136.
51 James T. Shotwell, The International Labor Organization as an Alternative to Violent Revolu-
tion, 166 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOc. Sc. 18, 19 (1933).
52 GHEBALDI, supra note 40, at 6. There were French and German minimum wage laws, and
joint "Whitley Councils" of workers and employers in England. In addition, the accepted "lesson"
of the October Revolution in Russia was the folly of rigid social castes. Id.
53 Id. at 7.
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and employers in the legislative process.5 4 Child labor was one of the first
labor subjects to be addressed55 A convention was signed setting a mini-
mum age for employment in industry at fourteen years.5 6 Work hours,
rest days and forced labor were addressed in subsequent agreements.
These arguments were signed by varying numbers of countries.
Though President Wilson himself convened the Conference in
Washington, the United States did not sign the 1919 Child Labor Con-
vention.58 Because of congressional resistance in the name of sover-
eignty, the United States refused to even join the ILO or its parent, the
League of Nations, but presidents after Wilson did contribute to and en-
dorse the ILO, and the United States eventually became an ILO member
in 1934.9
The ILO cannot enforce its child labor conventions.' ° The ILO
child labor standards are a guide, but the United States has not relied on
54 Mahaim, supra note 21, at 13. The ILO Constitution, as part of the League of Nations in
the Treaty of Versailles, was conceived by the Allied countries. It was notable for its tripartite struc-
ture, involving workers, employers, and government as partners in all negotiations. It provided for
universal application of worker standards. See Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, Part XIII 225
Consol. T.S. 373.
55 THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS EDUCATION AND RESEARCH FUND, TRADE'S HID-
DEN COSTS: WORKER RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 20 (1988) [hereinafter TRADE'S
HIDDEN COSTS].
56 Child labor-related conventions were the Convention on Minimum Age of Employment of
Children at Sea, July 9, 1920, 38 U.N.T.S. 109, revised by Oct. 24, 1936, 54 Stat. 1705, 40 U.N.T.S.
205; the Convention on Minimum Age for Agricultural Employment of Children, Nov. 16, 1921, 38
U.N.T.S. 143; Convention on Minimum Age for Employment of Trimmers and Stokers for Chil-
dren, Nov. 11, 1921, 38 U.N.T.S. 203; the Convention on Compulsory Medical Examination for
Children Employed at Sea, Nov. 11, 1921, 38 U.N.T.S. 217; Cheney, supra note 34.
57 Mahaim, supra note 21, at 16; Cheney, supra note 34.
58 Meyers, supra note 46, at 137. The Secretary of Labor represented the U.S. at Brussels and
Paris. Wilson's Secretary of Labor, William B. Wilson, was elected president of the conference.
The United States had shown interest but had not signed any of the early international labor
conventions. The Secretary of Labor had represented the U.S. at the Brussels Conference of 1897,
the first international discussion on the formulation and enforcement of labor standards, and at the
Paris Conference of 1900. These discussions led to the formation of the original International Asso-
ciation for Labor Legislation, to which the U.S. was a consistent, if frugal, financial contributor. The
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics budgeted a $200 annual contribution from 1903 until 1909. From
1910 until 1920 the amount was $1,000 annually.
59 Meyers, supra note 47, at 135-45; GHEBALI, supra note 40, at 117. The U.S. was more
interested in domestic application. The U.S. has signed only 7 of the now 159 ILO conventions,
preferring not to restrict itself to any outside standard. See also Linda L. Moy, The U.S. Legal Role
in International Labor Organization Conventions and Recommendations, 22 INT'L L. 767, 768
(1988).
60 Francis G. Wilson, The Enforcement of International Labor Standards 166 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95 (1933) ("Perhaps there will be a time in the distant future when govern-
ments and public opinion will demand a strong international system of control.").
Child labor abuses continue within nations that have signed the ILO convention on the subject.
ANURADHA VITrACHI, STOLEN CHILDHOOD: IN SEARCH OF THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (1989)
(Many nations today, like Italy, sign and violate ILO conventions).
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the ILO to actually establish the enforceable international standard for
child labor or any other worker rights.6 1 Indeed, the United States with-
drew from the ILO in 1975, citing the decline of tripartism, the increas-
ing politicization, and the lack of regard for procedure.62 Today the ILO
still works for its traditional goals by investigating and reporting abuses
of the rights of workers. These efforts are part of its International Pro-
gram for the Improvement of Working Conditions and Environment
(French initials PIACT).63
IV. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Enforceable agreements are key for trading nations seeking fair la-
bor standards today. Without enforcement they are no better off than the
19th century Belgian businessmen noted above. The international dis-
senter state can still ignore ILO fair labor standards and save itself the
costs of protecting workers. The dissenter's neighbors and trade partners
might suggest that the dissenter reform. These neighbors and trade part-
ners might even, as we shall discuss, apply economic pressure. 6" Accord-
ing to classical theories of international law, however, the dissenter is the
equal of each of the other nations in the international community.65
Other sovereign nations cannot legally reduce the dissenter's sover-
eign territorial power.66 Under this "positivist" theory, only the dissenter
itself, through consent, can limit its own power.67 Sometimes this consent
is implied, through the dissenter's acquiescence to a customary rule.68
61 See, e.g., Resolutions of the International Conference of Trade Unions, Berne, OcL 4, 1917, 2
ORIGINS OF THE INT'L LAB. ORGANIZATION 44, 47 (James T. Shotwell ed. 1934). Cf U.S. fair labor
standards, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
The U.S. has instead tried to establish standards through bilateral and unilateral measures, see
discussion infra notes 74-165 and accompanying text.
62 Bruce L. Rockwood, Human Rights and Wrongs: The United States in the ILO, A Modern
Morality Play, 10 CASE W. RE. J. INT'L L. 359 (1978).
The U.S. returned in 1980, citing improvements, GHEBALI, supra note 40, at 115. The ILO
resolved to strengthen tripartite decision making, to scrutinize complaints against Soviet bloc mem-
bers, to implement secret ballots, to defeat an anti-Israeli resolution, to adhere more closely to ILO
procedures, and to limit political meetings. Moy, supra note 59, at 768-769.
63 See Bureau International du Travail, ANNUAIRE DES STATISTIQUES Du TRAVAIL 1990
(50th ed. 1991) (providing statistics about employment and the labor force); GHEBALI, supra note
40, at 96-101.
64 This note need not consider the use of physical force as a means of altering a sovereign
nation's conduct. It is a tool of last resort, inappropriate in a discussion of child labor reform.
65 J. G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-29 (6th ed. 1967).
66 Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. E) No. 4, at 170.
67 STARKE, supra note 65, at 23-24. Positivist theory is premised on the Hegelian assumption
that each state has a will that can be restricted only through the consent of that state. International
law under this theory is the sum of rules to which each sovereign state has expressly or impliedly
agreed. Id.
68 J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 51-52 (5th ed. 1955).
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For example, international customs have developed on questions of con-
duct on the high seas, or territorial waters, and tribunals use those norms
as bases for new international law decisions.69 Such acquiescence can
hardly be found, however, when there has been no customary practice
among nations. In the case of child labor, it would be difficult to establish
the existence of a customary rule because child labor had been used for
centuries, limited only recently, and is still openly practiced in many
nations.
There do exist principles so universally accepted - the illegality of
piracy in international waters, for example - that all nations are account-
able to all others for a violation."0 These principles, however, reach this
status through wide acceptance.71 The mere proposal of legislation such
as the CLDA, designed to combat abuses in other countries, suggests
that child labor standards are not yet among these generally accepted
principles.
Because custom cannot help where there is no prior practice, and
generally accepted principles are so limited, a sovereign nation's express
consent on the matter of child labor, in treaties and other international
agreements, would be highly valued.72 Nations can, of course, ignore
their treaties, as individuals can breach their contracts, but the isolation
and retaliation those nations can suffer weigh against that practice.73
What nations do want is something in return for their expressly relin-
quished sovereignty.
A. The GAiT
Following World War II the original parties to the GATT agreed
that they each could gain economically by relinquishing some sover-
eignty in favor of a multilateral international trade agreement to lower
tariffs.74 The United States, dominant partner in victory, planned to dic-
tate the terms.75
It appeared then that fair labor standards would have a place in this
new trade agreement. In 1947, the United Nations Conference on Trade
69 Lotus, supra note 66; Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 116. See also I.C.J. Y.B., 1951-52,
at 78 (summarizing the issues and holding of the case).
70 HENRY J. STEINER & DETLER F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 835-36
(1986) (a "universal crime" is seen as a violation of the law of nations and, therefore it is appropriate
for any nation to prosecute a pirate in its own court. Other such crimes include slavery and torture.).
71 Id.
72 Lotus, supra note 66.
73 BRIERLY, supra note 68, at 55-57. See also Quincy Wright, Non-Military Intervention, in
THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5, 13-14 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffmann eds.
1968); ARTHUR LARSON, WHEN NATIONS DISAGREE 193-218 (1961) (regarding the high rate of
compliance with decisions of international tribunals).
74 DAM, supra note 18, at 10-14.
75 Id. at 10-16.
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and Employment drafted a charter for the International Trade Organiza-
tion (ITO), an agreement in which tariff reduction was only one con-
cern.76 Dramatic improvements in labor standards, including minimum
age requirements, were proposed.7 With reciprocal trade benefits at
stake, strong labor measures might have been enforceable. The aggressive
labor proposals, however, were watered down until the charter contained
only the admonition that members should eliminate "unfair labor condi-
tions, particularly in production for export."78
The Havana Charter, amending the ITO's structure for the last time
in 1948, was never ratified by the United States.79 The ITO's Havana
Charter conference had been convened and negotiated by President Tru-
man's representatives.80 They brought the agreement home and factions
in the business community descended upon Congress, objecting to the
ITO's provisions for active transactional roles for governments, and the
right of governments to limit the direct investments of foreign firms.81
The Truman administration had stated that the United States would
not accept the ITO until Congress approved it, and the Administration
would not seek that approval.82 The ITO faded as the GATT was passed
in a separate conference which dealt almost exclusively with tarifs.83 The
GATT came into existence as a tariff agreement, a way to lower escalat-
ing duties, specifically avoiding the divisive issues of working conditions
and fair labor standards that crippled other attempted agreements. 4 The
right to form and join trade unions, to receive equal wages for equal
work, to reasonable work hours, and to freedom from forced labor were
relegated to further unenforceable articles in the United Nations Decla-
76 Final Act and Related Documents of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment, U.N. Doc. Annex II E./ Conf. 2/C.3/78 (1948); The International Trade Organization 13,
1947-48 U.N.Y.B. 973-79, U.N. Sales No. 1949 I.
77 Fair Labor supra note 17, at 63-64 (Latin American countries proposed a system whereby
any nation would be relieved of its trade obligations to any other nation whose labor standards were
inferior).
78 CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 234 (1949).
79 DAM, supra note 18, at 11.
80 Id. at 10.
81 VERNON & SPAR, supra note 12, at 45.
82 DAM, supra note 18, at 14.
83 See CONGRESS OF THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE GATT NEGOTIA-
TIONS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY xvii (1987) [hereinafter "CONGRESS"] (stating that nontariff barri-
ers to trade can only be reduced when there is general agreement, as there was regarding tariffs, on
fundamental principles).
84 DAM, supra note 18, at 17. The GATT came into force provisionally on Jan. 1, 1948 and its
provisional basis endures under the 1947 Protocol of Provisional Application, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
UNTS 308. Nations not original contracting parties have acceded to the agreement through accept-
ance of this or later protocols, or by succession.
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ration of Human Rights.8" The rights of children could not be agreed
upon, except to note that they must be educated and protected. 6
Labor unions continued to lobby, however, for the ITO provisions
left out of the GATT, urging the President to characterize denials of
basic worker rights as unfair labor practices, and in the 1950's the United
States began pressing for changes to the GATT.8 7 The Renegotiation and
Escape clauses, which were the means by which GATT trading partners
sought redress, required a nation to be seriously injured before it took
GATT corrective action."8 The U.S. was unlikely to win a claim of seri-
ous injury based on violations of workers rights, and would certainly lose
a claim based on use of child labor, because numerous other GATT
members practiced the same violative conduct.89 The U.S. concentrated
instead on making the ILO fair labor standards part of the GATT. None
of the parties, however, could even agree as to what "unfair labor prac-
tices" were. 90
85 U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4, 23, 24. U.N. Doe. A/811 (1948).
U.S. and other original signers ignored the Havana Charter in favor of the GATT. Only the
prison labor provision, article XX, section (e), dealt specifically with labor standards. DAM, supra
note 18, at 10. But see GATT, supra note 17 art. XXIX (contracting parties agree to observe some
chapters of Havana Charter).
86 U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, 26, U.N. Doe. A/811 (1948).
87 Fair Labor, supra note 17 at 64.
88 The tariff concessions in GAIT cannot be rescinded unless the countries affected are com-
pensated. Violation by one party does not lead to punishment by the others. Rather, violation per-
mits the wronged party to withdraw concessions. Conflicts are to be resolved through bilateral
consultation. CONGRESS, supra note 83, at xi.
Note also that without ratification by the Senate, the GATT remains an executive agreement. In
order to give private American citizens remedies when seriously injured by imports, domestic legisla-
tion is necessary. The escape clause of the GATT was appropriated for this purpose in 1951, but
since then the "serious" injury requirement has been changed to "significant". VERNON & SPAR,
supra note 12, at 61-62.
89 Injury which is not strictly monetary will be difficult to prove, particularly when parties
disagree in principle as to what constitutes injury. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, June 30, 1967, Part I-Anti-Dumping Code, 19 U.S.T.
4349, 4351-52.
The dispute resolution machinery of GAIT allows a GATT "contracting party" to bring action
for nullification or impairment of even an implied benefit. However, if the nation accused of impair-
ing the rights of the complaining nation refuses to make "satisfactorily adjustment of the matter,"
the complaining nation can only submit the matter to the combined contracting parties for consider-
ation, and hope for possible authority to withdraw concessions under the GATT. A complaint based
on violation of minimum age limits for workers would be particularly difficult to win without agree-
ment by the other contracting parties that fair labor standards were implied in the GATT. See
GATT, supra note 17, article XXIII.
Other possible GAT remedies include the imposition of antidumping and countervailing du-
ties, but these are designed to compensate for the margin of injury between the quoted price and the
normal, fair value of the product. A measure such as the CLDA, which prohibits import of certain
goods, would not be a proper countervailing response. GATT, supra note 17, art. VI.
90 Fair Labor, supra note 17, at 64.
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B Resisting GATT reform
The United States that argues today for inclusion of fair labor stan-
dards in the GATT is not the same commanding force that shaped the
GATT, the International Monetary Fund and the Marshall Plan follow-
ing World War I1.91 Recent U.S. proposals, though cautiously framed as
mere "examinations" of.the relation of worker rights to the GATT, have
met consistent opposition.92 Without individual changes of heart among
trading partners, there is no reason to think the United States could now
establish fair labor standards that have been resisted from the beginning.
Some resistance is to be expected, particularly regarding child labor.
Working children are an agricultural tradition throughout the world,
and in less developed countries industry is a fairly recent addition to the
culture.93 Working parents barely able to feed themselves are glad to see
their children bring money home.94 Child labor can be a manifestation of
a family's decision to improve itself economically." Often, at the subsis-
tence level, the families cannot even consider allowing children to go to
school; letting them stay home to play is out of the question.96 The only
choice is between work at home or work away.97 Foreign producers,
meanwhile, are loathe to give up what they see as their single advantage
in the world market: cheap labor.9" The U.S., with its large markets and
tempting grants, can press foreign political leaders to reform, but these
leaders themselves may hold natural bias against outside interference, or
91 See generally ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984). The IMF was established to further international trade
and stabilize exchange rates. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22,
1944, amended April 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937. See also VERNON & SPAR, supra
note 12, at 44.
92 Charnovitz, supra note 14, at 575; Theresa H. Amato, Note, Labor Rights Conditionality:
United States Trade Legislation and the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 79, 93
(1990).
When the United States proposed an informal working party to make recommendations to the
GATT regarding labor rights, six nations, though not supporting the U.S. proposal, said they could
support a working party on labor rights in principle. Seven of thirty-three nations supported the
plan. The nine nations strongly opposed were LDCs.
93 VIrACHI, supra note 60.
94 NARDINELLI, CHILD LABOR AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 34 (1990). The U.S.
State Department reports that children in Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana,
Guatemala, India, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, and the Republic of Yemen are
pressured by tradition and necessity to bring in money for their poor families. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990, 151, 231, 354, 398, 498, 522,
607, 645, 1272, 1399, 141423, 1442, 1558, 1576, 1677 (Joint Comm. Print 1991).
95 Id.
96 Tanya Kucherov, Exploitation of Children Widespread, ILO Reports, MONTHLY LAB. REv.,
Nov. 1980, at 43-45.
97 Id.
98 TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 55, at 7.
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they may be unable to control the producers and those workers who
want child labor to continue.
Those resisting international standards further criticize the United
States for restrictive trade policies of its own.99 Labor costs have emerged
as a principal factor in distinguishing costs of production in various
countries. U.S. capital has followed that cheap labor to other countries,
often ignoring abandoned American workers.'00 This cannot be hidden
from the rest of the international trade community. The U.S. interest,
though not necessarily single-minded, has been described as such abroad,
and resisted on grounds that it is mere expedience. 10 1
V. TEMPTING ILLEGALITY
The United States can respond to this multilateral resistance in three
ways. It can wait. It can innovate within the terms of existing agree-
ments. It might also act in disobedience of these multilateral agreements,
as a means of changing them. As far as international fair labor standards
were concerned, the executive branch preferred to lobby and wait
through much of the 1980's.1 The Congress was more aggressive, press-
ing for change through nonreciprocal programs and in increasingly firm
unilateral trade measures that other nations claimed were illegal under
the GATT.0 3 The CLDA is heir to this trend.
A. Nonreciprocal Programs
Within the terms of existing agreements, one method for effecting
change in other countries is the nonreciprocal grant. Rather than bargain
for a new treaty or a renegotiation, the granting nation simply establishes
terms of eligibility for an nonreciprocal benefit."0 4 Quid pro quo is actu-
ally required because foreign nations must meet the terms to receive the
99 European Community Approach to Testing and Certification: Should the U.S. Government
Play a Role?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Exports, Tax Policy, and Special Problems of the
House Comm. on Small Business, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 122, 126-28 (1990) (EC Report on U.S.
Trade Barriers and Unfair Practices). The report says that the United States is guilty "to some
extent," of protectionism spurred by the U.S trade deficit. It notes that a number of domestic trade
laws conflict with the United States' existing multilateral agreements. Id at 126-27. The EC sug-
gests the United States "eliminate the unilateral elements of its legislation and bring it fully into
conformity with multilaterally agreed rules." Ia at 128.
100 TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 55, at 10.
101 The European Community is considering lodging a complaint with GATT over the recent
U.S. 10% tax surcharge on the portion of retail car prices above $30,000, calling the tax discrimina-
tory. Auto makers such as Mercedes, BMW, and Porsche are affected. A Discrimnatory Tax?,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1991, at A6.
102 7 Int'L Trade Rep. (BNA) no. 3, 83 (Jan. 17, 1990).
103 Id. at 284.
104 2 HARVEY KAYE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRACTICE § 38.01 (1987).
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grant, but the nations know this when entering into the agreement. 10 5 By
definition, the grants may be made on any basis Congress chooses. Other
multilateral and bilateral obligations need not be disturbed. The United
States uses the nonreciprocal grants to encourage compliance with inter-
national fair labor standards. The U.S. could specifically require enforced
child labor prohibitions in any country that sought this special treatment,
but it has not.
Through the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA),
twenty-seven nations in that region are eligible to apply for trade benefits
with the United States. 116 Once a CBERA applicant country meets cer-
tain mandatory criteria, that country is evaluated at the President's dis-
cretion as to the "degree to which workers in the country are afforded
reasonable work place conditions and have the right to organize and bar-
gain collectively.""1 7 The president may terminate benefits if basic rights
in the agreement are violated.108 No specific injury need be shown.109
Minimum age is not specifically mentioned in the CBERA. "Rea-
sonable work place conditions" could be construed to mean the prohibi-
tion of child labor, but given the executive's failure to act to stop ongoing
abuses in beneficiary countries, the CBERA is not likely to be used in
that manner.110 Nevertheless, within the bounds of the CBERA man-
date, the executive has successfully engineered workers rights improve-
105 Id. at § 39.01.
106 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2702. Section 2702(b) lists the na-
tions for which U.S. trade and investment preferences are available:
Anguilla Grenada Saint Vincent
Antigua and Barbuda Guatemala The Grenadines
The Bahamas Guyana Suriname
Barbados Haiti Trinidad and Tobago
Belize Honduras Cayman Islands
Costa Rica Jamaica Montserrat
Dominica Nicaragua Netherlands Antilles
Dominican Republic Panama Saint Christopher-Nevis
El Salvador Santa Lucia Turks and Caicos Islands
British Virgin Islands
107 Id.; Steve Charnovitz, Caribbean Basin Initiative: Setting Labor Standards, 107 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 54 (1984). Like the CLDA, the CBI has empowered the U.S. Secretary of Labor to
monitor compliance.
108 Under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, a beneficiary nation's failure to grant
worker rights would be grounds for the Executive to refuse eligibility. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(7) (Supp.
I1 1990). 19 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2) would presumably allow the Executive to terminate a beneficiary
nation's eligibility for the same failure, if Congress and that nation were properly notified.
109 19 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2).
110 Costa Rica, a CBERA country, allows children of 12 to work, and children of even younger
years are a major labor factor in the thriving "informal" economy. Haiti also permits labor by
twelve-year-olds. The widespread Haitian "Restavek" practice of urban households adopting poor
rural youth to work long hours as servants continues unchecked. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra
note 94.
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ments in nations that did not initially meet the eligibility requirements. 11
Though no beneficiaries have specifically been cut off on the basis of la-
bor rights abuses, several have pledged to observe fair labor standards
previously unmet in their countries. 12
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), mentioned above is
based on the GATT. 1" 3 the preferences are nonreciprocal and therefore
I 1 The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras each agreed to
improve labor conditions in order to qualify as CBERA beneficiaries. Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Workers
Rights and International Trade, 81st ANN. MEETING OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. 60 (1987).
112 Fair Labor, supra note 17, at 66 (Haiti was most notable in its shift from repression to
permission of labor unions).
113 Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984 [hereinafter "GSP"], Pub. L. No.
98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, 3018 (1984) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 2461(9)(c) (1988). The GSP assumes that
without fair labor standards, nations are unlikely to mature into viable trading partners. TRADE's
HIDDEN COSTS supra note 55, at 10.
Burma, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Romania are sanctioned and are therefore ineligible. Namibia,
Chile, Paraguay and the Central African Republic have been recently reinstated. 8 INT'L TRADE
REP. 181 (1991).
Independent countries designated to qualify for GSP benefits are:
Angola Fiji Morocco
Antigua & Barbuda Gambia Mozambique
Argentina Ghana Nauru
Bahamas Grenada Nepal
Bahrain Guatemala Niger
Bangladesh Guinea Oman
Barbados Guinea Bissau Pakistan
Belize Guyana Panama
Bhutan Haiti Papua New Guinea
Bolivia Honduras Paraguay
Botswana Hungary Peru
Brazil India Philippines
Brunei Indonesia Poland
Burkina Faso Israel Portugal
Burundi Ivory Coast Rwanda
Cameroon Jamaica Saint Lucia
Cape Verde Jordan Saint Vincent
Central African Republic Kenya & the Grenadines
Chad Kiribati Sao Tome & Principe
Colombia Korea, Republic of Senegal
Comoros Lebanon Seychelles
Congo Lesotho Sierra Leone
Costa Rica Madagascar Singapore
Cyprus Malawi Solomon Islands
Djibouti Malaysia Somalia
Dominica Maldives Sri Lanka
Dominican Republic Mali Sudan
Ecuador Malta Surinam
Egypt Mauritania Swaziland
El Salvador Mauritius Syria
Equatorial Guinea Mexico Taiwan
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are not binding. Tariffs on exports from less developed countries are low-
ered in order to stimulate those exports and direct the country's re-
sources to manufacturing, away from strict agriculture and raw materials
production.' 14 The program was designed to speed the growth and mod-
ernization of the less developed members of GATT.115 Specific labor
standards were added to the GSP by Congress in 1984 as a further test of
beneficiary eligibility. 116 A violation of listed "internationally recognized
worker rights" renders an otherwise preferred nation ineligible.117 These
worker rights include a minimum age requirement.118
The worker rights provisions of the GSP are not strict, however, nor
are they strictly enforced. Beneficiaries may meet the standards by
merely "taking steps" to implement these worker rights.119
Tanzania Western Samoa
Thailand Tuvalu Yemen
Togo Uganda Yugoslavia
Trinidad Tobago Uruguay Zaire
Tunisia Vanuatu Zambia
Turkey Venezuela Zimbabwe
Territories and non-independent Countries include:
Anguilla Gibraltar Saint Christopher-Nevis
British Indian Ocean Heard Island and Saint Helena
Territory McDonald Islands Tokelau
Cayman Islands Hong Kong Trust Territory of the
Christmas Island (Australia) Macau Pacific Island
Cocos (Keeling) Islands Netherlands Antilles Turks and Caicos Islands
Cook Islands New Caledonia Virgin Islands, British
Falkland Islands Niue Wallis & Futuna
(Islas Malvinas) Norfolk Islands Western Sahara
French Polynesia Pitcairn Islands
114 Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Principle of Preferential Treatment in the Law of GATT.- Toward
Achieving the Objective of an Equitable World Trading System, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 291, 302
(1988).
115 Id. at 303 (stating that the GSP will lead to economic advancements for the developing
countries). Those granting preference to less developed countries formally agreed those grants
would not be binding.
The fair labor practice requirements of the GSP were justified insofar as those practices serve to
guarantee healthy economic development. If, for example, labor is free to organize, then they will
bargain a wage that spreads the returns of increased export throughout the economy instead of
giving those returns to a moneyed few. Likewise, prohibition of child labor will mean healthier
development and, where schools are available, time for education, which in turn means a more
marketable labor pool. TRADE'S HIDDEN CosTs, supra note 55, at 25.
116 Fair Labor, supra note 17, at 67.
117 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(7).
118 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4)(d).
119 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7). The GSP employs its own, broad fair labor standards without
reference to ILO standards. These standards are essentially the same in both documents. The presi-
dent's discretion, in asserting a violation of these standards, is broad. If U.S. economic interests
dictate, he can limit revocation of benefits to a single industry. Florshiem Shoe Co., Div. ofInterco v.
United States, 744 F.2d 787, 794-95 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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More importantly, executive discretion severely limits the effective-
ness of the GSP in practice.12 The USTR, in a procedure not required in
the legislation, insists on third party petitions to force investigations, and
those petitions have languished for years without action.' 2'
For example, on March 29, 1990 the International Labor Rights
Education and Research Fund fied suit against President Bush and
United States Trade Representative Carla Hills to force action on numer-
ous petitions.122 The AFL-CIO, a plaintiff in the action, complained of
deep disappointment "that this [GSP] lever has been so rarely utilized by
the USTR."'123 A telling assessment of the GSP worker rights provisions
was delivered by Federal District Court Judge Gerhard Gesell. He dis-
missed this civil suit against President Bush because of "an apparent to-
tal lack of standards" in the legislation.124 The judge said there was only
"a vague requirement of review from time to time," and that there was
"no statutory direction which provides any basis for this court to act."' 25
The GSP, therefore, prints a long list of nations which the United States
could encourage to meet international fair labor standards, but gives no
guarantee that these professed concerns of Congress will be met.
Though not a grant of trade preferences, the Overseas Private In-
vestment Corporation (OPIC) program, which insures U.S. private in-
vestment abroad against political risk, can benefit a foreign nation by
making it safe for U.S. private investors.' 26 Fair labor standards in the
host country were added as an eligibility requirement to OPIC in
120 Dozens of petitions for worker rights violations have been filed, but out of 140 countries
receiving benefits, only Romania and Nicaragua have been removed as beneficiaries. Paraguay and
Chile have been suspended. GSP Subcommittee, Office of the U.S Trade Representative, General
Review of the Generalized System of Preferences, 10 INT'L LAB. WORKER RTs. 6 (1987).
121 Holly Burkhaller, USTR Boycotts International Labor Rights, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 9, 1990
at 25 (Americas Watch's comprehensive petition on labor rights violations in El Salvador has been
passed over three years running).
12 Id. See also 7 INT'L TRADE REP. 1691, 1704 (1990); International Labor Rights Educ. and
Research Fund v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 495 (D.C. 1990) aff'd 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (dis-
missed as non-justiciable).
123 7 INT'L TRADE REP. 1464, 1504 (1990) (the AFL-CIO wanted action on complaints
against El Salvador, Bangladesh, and Syria. The USTR has never initiated a GSP workers' rights
investigation).
The AFL-CIO is the United States' largest labor union. JACK C. PLANO & MILTON GREEN-
BURG, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY 342 (5th ed. 1979).
124 Bush, 752 F. Supp. at 497.
125 Id.
126 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 231, 75 Stat. 424, 432 (1961) (codi-
fied at 22 U.S.C. § 2191(a) (1986)). The Overseas Private Investment Corporation pays its own ex-
penses with premiums received from investors who are insured against loss arising from political
turmoil or nationalization by foreign governments. OPIC INFORMATION OFFICER, OPIC INVEST-
MENT HANDBOOK (1989).
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1985.127 The amendment was made because fair treatment of workers,
and the right to associate and organize, were called good indicators of
stability in a trade partner. 2 ' In OPIC, however, as in the GSP, the
country in which investment is to be insured must only be "taking steps"
to meet a minimum standard of fair labor practice. 12 9 These standards
are again subject to the same executive discretion that guides implemen-
tation of the GSP program.130 The OPIC legislative history gives more
specific guidance as to what "taking steps" means, but discretion
remains.
The abolition of child labor might be demanded of over 150 small,
mostly undeveloped nations through U.S. nonreciprocal programs. Child
labor continues unabated in many of these countries. 3 ' Further, none of
the countries removed from eligibility for the GSP and OPIC programs
has suffered that fate specifically because of child labor abuses."3 2
B. Unilateral Measures
The United States has long regulated imports. When a customs of-
ficer inspects or even turns away imported firearms or chemicals, for
health or safety reasons, he acts under authority of a government that is
within its international rights.'33 Each sovereign nation may protect its
territory and citizens. 31 Under the GATT, when the United States can
show a trade partner has violated tariff agreements, it may act to right
127 Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-204,
§ 5, 99 Stat. 1669, 1670 (1985) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 2 191(a) (1988).
128 HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3166, H.R. REP.
No. 285, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1985 U.S. C.C.A.N 2572, 2577-2578. But cf,
James M. Zimmerman, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Worker Rights: The Loss of
Role Models for Employment Standards in the Foreign Workplace, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 603 (1991) (arguing that the U.S. should not "summarily condemn" foreign nations for failing
to take steps to implement internationally recognized worker rights. Rather than simply deny OPIC
insurance protection to Americans who would invest in such countries, Mr. Zimmerman argues that
Congress should amend the OPIC worker rights provisions to allow each investor to certify that the
project in which he invests will meet those internationally recognized standards. The certified pro-
ject could serve as a model for other industry in that nation. Like the exception clause of the CLDA,
this process would permit foreign businesses that meet international standards to benefit through
access to the U.S.).
129 22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a)(I) (1988). OPIC adheres to ILO standards. Romania, Nicaragua,
Chile and Paraguay were removed from OPIC eligibility after their removal from the GSP program.
130 22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a) (1988).
131 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 94.
132 8 INT'L TRADE REP. 181 (1991).
133 STARKE, supra note 65, at 51. See, eg., 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (regulating imports for national
security reasons).
134 See, e.g., § 19 U.S.C. 1431-67. Other sections specify methods of regulation and targeted
goods. See 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (cutlining marking of imported goods); 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (prohibiting
import of immoral goods, lottery tickets, obscene materials); 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (prohibiting goods
made with convict labor, consistent with the GATM).
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the balance. t3 The GATT also permits the United States to levy tempo-
rary anti-dumping duties when a foreign nation sells subsidized domestic
surplus below international market price, undercutting U.S. firms.'36 The
contracting parties to the GATT have agreed that such practices are ac-
tionable.137 The CLDA is different because its basis for regulation is not
safety and not the GATT. The use of child labor is not a violation of a
generally recognized principle in international law, nor of any binding
treaty.
138
The CLDA would therefore further limit the choices of any sover-
eign nation that chose to trade with the United States, shrinking their
labor pool, giving them nothing but the trading status quo in return. Be-
cause GATT members have agreed to accept goods from all members
equally, such a prohibition on the import of goods, grounded on a stan-
dard the GATT has not acknowledged, violates the agreement.13 9
The CLDA is not, however, the first attempt at this sort of unilat-
eral action. The President and the USTR are already empowered under
domestic law to address unfair trade practices not covered by interna-
tional principles or agreements. The Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988 (OTCA), through its notorious section 301, directs the
USTR to retaliate when "unreasonable" trade practices of a foreign na-
tion affect the United States."4 The 1988 amendments to the OTCA
specify that a denial of worker rights is an unreasonable trade practice. 14 1
Any success of the broad OTCA in affecting foreign economies would
bode well for the more specific CLDA, but these amendments have been
of limited use in establishing internationally accepted fair labor
standards.
C. Section 301 of the OTCA
The Trade Act of 1974 included a section 301, designed as a tool for
enforcing trade agreements and ending unfair foreign trade practices. 42
The President was authorized to "respond to any act, policy, or practice
of a foreign country or instrumentality that (i) is inconsistent with the
135 GATT, supra note 17, arts. XIX, XXVIII.
136 Id. art. VI.
137 For an overview of the procedures an importer must observe in an antidumping case, see,
Valerie A. Slater, The U.S Importer's Perspective on U.S. Antitrade Actions Against Korea and Tai-
wan, 11 MICH. J. I rr'rL L. 403 (1990).
138 Supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
139 GATT, supra note 17, art. I, sec. 1.
140 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102
Stat. 1164 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988) [hereinafter "OTCA"].
141 Id. (the export targeting and anticompetitive behavior were also labeled "unreasonable.").
142 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1988)).
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provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any
trade agreement, or (ii) is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory
and burdens or restricts United States commerce." '143 The executive
branch was slow to take action under the earliest versions of section
301.1' Section 301 was therefore amended in 1984, to give the President
and the USTR even greater authority, and to clarify terms such as "un-
justifiable" and "unreasonable."' 145
With the growth of the U.S. trade deficit in 1985, pressure mounted
for even stronger action against competitors seen as profiting unfairly in
their trade with the United States. 146 Congress began amending the
Trade Act to restrict executive discretion and to further define unfair
practices.' 47 The amendments included workers' rights provisions and a
requirement of a minimum age for employment. 4 Although worker
rights were only actionable where a "persistent pattern" of abuses had
been shown, and could be evaluated in light of a nation's particular eco-
nomic development, the USTR opposed these amendments, fearing
counter-retaliation by trade partners. 149 Congress approved them any-
way, in the 1988 OTCA. 150 Congress specified that section 301 was sup-
posed to be harsh because it was intended as a negotiating tool.' 5 '
At a glance, the 1988 section 301 appears harsh indeed. First, the
USTR is given great independence to pursue nations engaged in unfair
trade practices and to choose the appropriate retaliation.' Second, ac-
tion on unfair trade practices is mandatory when in violation of an ex-
isting agreement. 53 These changes, however, only appear to transform
section 301. The USTR remains the President's appointee, and is there-
143 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a) (1974) (amended 1988).
144 Section 301 was seen as ineffective because the administration continued to take trade
problems through the GATT procedure. Many of those cases were never resolved. Warren
Maruyama, Section 301 and the Appearance of Unilateralism, 11 MICH J. INT'L L. 394, 395-396
(1990).
145 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
146 Maruyama, supra note 144, at 397.
147 Steven R. Phillips, The New Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988: Trade Wars or Open Markets? 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 491 (1989).
148 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
149 Comprehensive Trade Legislation: Hearings on HR. 3 Before the House Committee on Ways
and Means and Its Subcommittee on Trade, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 152 (1987) (USTR Clayton Yeut-
ter testified that, concerning enforcement of section 301, he was "not sure we can get much tougher
than we have been over the last 18 or 24 months.").
150 OTCA, 102 Stat. 1164 (amending Trade and Tariff Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1978).
151 H. R. Rep. No. 40 (Part 1), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1987); Judith Hippler Bello & Alan
F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301,
17 STAN. J. INt'L L. 1 (1990).
152 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(a)(1).
153 Id.
Vol. 24:631
TOWARD INTERNATIONAL FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
fore still not entirely independent. 154 Also, section 301 action is not as
mandatory as it might seem.
When section 301 action is mandatory, a waiver of U.S. action can
still be arranged when a GATT panel determines that no existing agree-
ment between the parties has been violated.' This waiver provision ef-
fectively funnels any mandatory section 301 cases through the GATT
dispute resolution procedures. 56 Section 301 action by the U.S. will
cease, pending the decision of a GATT panel, and the USTR can abide
by the GATT panel's decision rather than assert a U.S. domestic statute
against the foreign trading partner. "Successful" section 301 actions have
been those in which the USTR has abandoned her section 301 investiga-
tion because the threat of closing the U.S. market to the "violating"
country brought that country to the GATT negotiating table, and the
violation alleged would have been a violation of the GATT agreement.' 5
7
Section 301 does, therefore, encourage bilateral negotiations over is-
sues of sufficient concern to the President and the USTR. Action under
the CLDA could lead to the same kind of bargaining. This would follow
the long standing GATT practice of avoiding disputes. As early as 1957,
with Congress threatening serious restrictions on cotton textile exports,
President Eisenhower's representatives encouraged GATT partner Japan
to "voluntarily" restrict cotton textile exports.'58 U.S. agreements over
the years regarding steel, autos, semiconductors, trade preferences for
Caribbean nations, as well as free trade agreements with Israel, Canada,
154 Alan F. Homer & Judith Hippler, The 1988 Trade Bil Savior or Scourge of the Interna-
tional Trading System? 23 INTL L. 523, 528 (1989).
155 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a)(2)(A).
156 Phillips, supra note 147, at 531-532.
This waiver power is in addition to the general discretion of the USTR to deny a petition, or to
determine that the petition falls within a mandatory category. It has been suggested that for an
executive branch not eager to take action against a trading partner, the Section 301 retaliation provi-
sions are "mandatory but not compulsory.. .assuming that is a hair you can split." Id. at 534, citing
133 CONG. REc. S4661 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1987) (statement of Sen. Packwood). But see 4 INT'L
TRADE REP. 1564-65 (Japan, Mexico, and the EC criticize section 301 as counter to GATT, Japa-
nese economic counselor Yoshigi Nogami calling the section "back door protectionism").
157 7 INT'L TRADE REP. 205 (1990) (USTR terminates unfair trade investigation concerning
EC oilseeds subsidies when EC agrees to GATT finding of violation of GATT rules); Id at 1794
(USTR terminates section 301 investigation after GATT panel ruling prompts Thailand to open it's
cigarette market).
For an example of USTR procedure see Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Initiation of
Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment: European Community Third Country
Meat Directive, 56 Fed. Reg. 1663 (1991) (where a discriminatory trade practice complaint by U.S.
pork producers prompted the USTR to consult first with the EC under GATT article XXIII, to
abandon that avenue when the EC took steps to eliminate discrimination, then to continue bilateral
talks when the EC chose to renounce its promised improvements).
158 VERNIN & SPAR, supra note 12, at 167 (arguing that the U.S. is stepping away from role as
"keeper of international law," and starting to view the trade world as other nations do: one agree-
ment at a time).
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and Mexico, all employed bilateral negotiations. 159 In practice, section
301 action begins when investigations are requested, then "priority"
countries are identified by the USTR and investigations are opened.16
Negotiations between the two nations follow. With this bilateral opera-
tion, section 301 matches the tradition of GATT negotiations.1 6  The
section 301 investigation can bring trade partners to the negotiating
table.
Some commentators have argued that aggressive use of such legisla-
tion, under present circumstances, might be the United States' only hope
for changing the GATT. 6z According to this theory, Congress is merely
trying to modernize and broaden an old, functionally limited interna-
tional trade agreement.1 63
Section 301 has done little, however, to end child labor abuses. Sec-
tion 301's mandatory provisions do not force action on child labor or on
any other international labor abuse. Like other unfair practices not ac-
tionable under the GATT, an abuse of child labor is a less than attractive
159 Id.; Gerald F. Seib, Bush Makes Progress on Trade Issues in Mexico, Gains Support for Gulf
Policy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 1990, at A28.
Because free trade was considered the ultimate goal of the GATT, provisions in article XXIV
allow an exception from the most favored nation principle when nations form regional customs
unions or free trade areas. DAM, supra note 18, at 274-283.
160 See eg., 7 Int'l Trade Rep. 284 (Feb. 28, 1990) (submissions from the Automotive Parts &
Accessories Association, the Semiconductor Industry Association, Southwire Corp., Allied-Signal
Corp., the Rice Millers' Association and eight other parties requested the USTR target Japan for
unfair trade practices.).
161 See, GA7T.y USTR Hills "Fairly Hopeful of Success in Uruguay Round of Trade Negotia-
tions" BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Feb. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAITD File.
(USTR Hills relying on bilateral discussions since GATT talks recently collapsed).
162 Professor Robert Hudec has defined "justified disobedience" as follows:
1. The objective must be to secure legal change consistent with general objectives of the agree-
ment being disobeyed.
2. Reform must first be attempted through good faith negotiation under the terms of the
agreement.
3. The disobedience must be accompanied by an offer to continue to negotiate and must cease
upon achieving the objective.
4. The extent of disobedience must be limited to what is necessary to achieve the reforms.
5. The disobedient party must accept the existing law as fully as possible, even while dis-
obeying. Under GATT this would mean the party must accept the panel proceeding and the
decision and even the retaliation that may result.
Address by Professor Robert E. Hudec (March 29, 1990), in AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L.: PROC. OF THE
84TH ANN. MEETING, at 34 (1990). Cf Harlan Mandel, Note, In Pursuit of the Missing Link:
International Worker Rights and International Trade? 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 443, 456
(1989) (discussion of classical international law theory of "retorsion").
163 Mandel, supra note 162; Cf 136 CONG. REc. S. 5486 (daily ed. May 1, 1990) (statement of
Senator Lautenberg introducing the Environmental Protection and Trade Equity Act, which would
link eligibility for trade preferences to environmental protection by the beneficiary country. The
USTR opposes the bill as undercutting the cooperative development of international environmental
standards.).
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cause for a USTR dedicated to working within the GATT framework. 16
If the use of children in mining and manufacturing jobs was a priority
concern of the U.S. executive, section 301 could have been used to force
action. If that had been the case, however, it is unlikely that the propo-
nents of the CLDA would have offered this bill three times in three
years. 1
65
VI. THE CHILD LABOR DETERRENCE ACT
When Congressman Pease first proposed the Child Labor Deter-
rence Act in 1989, he said, "access to the American marketplace is pow-
erful leverage and should be used positively to encourage foreign
producers and importers to treat defenseless children with dignity." 166
Senator Donald Riegle (R-Mich.), introducing the 1990 Senate version of
the bill, described the victims of child labor as: first, helpless working
children, like those in Morracco making rugs in Morocco 6 days a week
for 15 cents an hour; and second, American workers, unable to compete
with the slave wages paid in abusing countries. 6 The two sponsors
agreed that the only way to stop the exploitation was to dry up the mar-
kets for these goods. 161
The CLDA is different from other unilateral means used to insure
fair labor standards abroad. If it is signed into law, it would impose
stricter limits on executive discretion.1 69
Under the CLDA the Secretary of Labor would be responsible for
compiling an annual report, "using all available information regarding
the commercial exploitation of children," identifying the countries that
condone the use of children under the age of 15 as labor in manufactur-
ing or mining, and listing those that "effectively discourage" that use.' 70
The language is broad here but does not give the Secretary great discre-
tion in deciding which nations make which list. The Secretary's sources
are ordained in the bill to include international human rights groups,
labor organizations, religious groups, and children's advocacy organiza-
164 See An Interview with U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills 7 INT'L TRADE REP. 84 (1990)
(indicating that GATT does not now deal with several problems of the lesser developed world); Ian
Charles Bailon, The Implications of Making the Denial of Internationally Recognized Worker Rights
Actionable Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 73, 100-101 (1987).
165 CLDA, supra note 6.
166 135 CONG. REC. H2162, (daily ed. May 24, 1989) (introducing H.R. 2485, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989)).
167 136 CONG. REC. S7035 (daily ed. May 24, 1990). Senator Reigle has also pointed out that,
according to ILO statistics, use of child labor had grown 57% in the years 1979 through 1986. Id.
168 Id. at S7036.
169 H.R. 3786, supra note 6, § 5(a)(unless certain exceptions are met, "the Secretary may not
permit the entry of any manufactured article that is a product of that country [violating the mini-
mum age requirement]).
170 Id. § 4(0.
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tions. 171 To further ensure a reliable report, private citizens could peti-
tion to have countries identified as condoning child labor.172 The
Secretary would be required to respond to each petition, citing the facts
and reasons supporting her decision.173 This approach is true to the
CLDA's stated policy of establishing a new international rule.17 4 A relia-
ble, quotable source of information regarding child labor abuses could be
cited by foreign citizens opposed to the practice in their own countries.
International pressure could be brought to bear on offending govern-
ments, industries, and perhaps even on particular producers.
Once a nation is identified as not effectively prohibiting child labor,
"during the effective identification period for a foreign country the Secre-
tary may not permit the entry of any manufactured article that is a prod-
uct of that country." 175 This identification would be revocable, but only
when the Secretary, in a written opinion, reports to Congress that the
"foreign country concerned has adopted, and is effectively enforcing,
laws prohibiting the production of products with child labor within the
country." 176
The tainted goods would not be taxed. They would be prohibited,
and the importer fined, or even jailed. 177 The bill provides for exceptional
cases by allowing the importer to "satisfy the Secretary that the importer
of the article has taken steps to ensure, to the extent practicable, that the
article is not a product of child labor." 171
The Secretary of Labor's discretion would exist, then, in promulgat-
ing a petition process and in deciding whether an importer met the ex-
ception language. 179 If a nation was identified as condoning child labor,
and an American importer nevertheless wanted to deal with one of that
country's exporters, under the language of the CLDA the contract be-
tween the importer and his foreign supplier would be required as evi-
dence in the Secretary's decision to make an exception.1 80 That contract
171 Id. § 4.
172 Id. § 4(b)(1).
173 Id. § 4(b)(2)(B).
174 Id. § 3.
175 Id. § 5(a)(1) (the "effective identification period" is defined as beginning on the date on
which the country is identified in the Federal Register as condoning child labor, and ending when
revocation of that identification is published in same).
176 Id. § 4(d)(2)(A).
177 Id. §§ 6(b) and (c) (the CLDA provides for civil fines of up to $25,000. Criminal penalties
for intentional violation include fines of from $10,000 to $35,000 or imprisonment for one year, or
both).
178 Id. § 5(b)(1).
179 Id. § 7.
180 Id. § 5(b)(2)("The documentation required by the Secretary...shall include written evi-
dence that the agreement setting forth the terms and conditions of the acquisition or provision of the
imported article includes the condition that the article not be a product of child labor.").
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would at a minimum have to include the condition that the article
purchased not be a product of child labor.181 The potential for collusion
between importer and exporter is high when each has such an incentive
to include a written contract provision forbidding the use of child labor,
so the regulations governing the exception petition process must be strict.
When an American importer petitions for exception, that means his for-
eign trading partner produces goods in a country identified as allowing
the use of child labor. The foreign exporter must truly be the exception to
the rule that he claims to be, or the exception petition process will anni-
hilate the CLDA.18
2
VII. EFFEcTs, REAL AND IMAGINED OF THE CHILD LABOR
DETERRANCE AcT
The CLDA's prohibition on entry of certain goods conflicts with
existing U.S. international commitments under the GATT. According to
its sponsors, that conflict is justified because the CLDA will aid two
groups: foreign children and American workers. 8 ' The bill also conflicts
with private interests inside and outside the United States. Despite the
conflicts it provokes, the CLDA may function as a first step in establish-
ing a new international principle of minimum working age. We will con-
sider each of these effects.
A. Existing Agreements: Clashing with the GAIT
In his remarks introducing the 1989 CLDA in the House, Congress-
man Pease argued that the United States could change the GATT.1" 4 By
using access to the American marketplace as leverage, the Congressman
suggested, the United States could "encourage" foreign producers to
abide by a minimum age for employment.'85 As discussed above, this
threat of lost markets has been effective in bringing otherwise reluctant
trade partners to the negotiating table.186 Section 301 and worker rights
provisions in nonreciprocal programs, however, have not been invoked in
the name of child labor standards.187
The worst case scenario might have the United States halting the
import of goods from a country that enjoys most favored nation status
under the GATT, and never considering that nation's willingness to bar-
gain. The foreign nation affected could be unwilling to adopt a new stan-
181 Id.
182 See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
183 Pease, supra note 7. See 136 CONG. REc. supra note 167.
184 135 CONG. REc. supra note 166, at H2161.
185 Id. at H2162.
186 Supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text.
187 Supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
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dard that flies in the face of its traditions and its economic self-interest. If
such a nation does not rely on trade with the United States, or need its
political or military influence to an extent sufficient to balance these
traditional and economic interests, the United States might lose that na-
tion as a trading partner.
Equally as problematic, the United States could be called to a
GATT dispute resolution panel.1 8 As discussed above, the United States
will have difficulty justifying its prohibition before such a panel. 89 Seri-
ous injury stemming exclusively from the use of child labor will be hard
to prove in a forum that has consistently refused to even address the
matter.1 0 The United States will, therefore, be forced to argue that the
use of child labor creates an unfair trade barrier. The CLDA, however,
exists because the United States has made that argument unsuccessfully
for the last forty years.191
The CLDA assumes a better case. The CLDA, attempting to capi-
talize on the success of section 301 actions also relies on the seductive-
ness of the U.S. market and bilateral negotiations. Section 301 actions do,
however, leave room for negotiation and rarely are able to force action.
The CLDA, on its face, demands capitulation, but there is no reason
why, once a customs agent stops goods at the border, it should make any
difference that the agent's orders came from the President through the
USTR or from Congress through the CLDA. It might be argued that
actions under section 301 can cautiously target nations that the U.S.
knows it can beat at the negotiating table, because those nations need
access to the American market, or because the U.S. can afford to risk the
loss of the trade.192 The CLDA, however, should not be so easily
distinguished.
First, the CLDA targets an abuse that, though widespread, is partic-
ularly offensive to large numbers of people throughout the world, and
outlawed by many governments. Second, child labor reform threatens
less and demands less of foreign governments and industries than other
fair labor standards. Political organizations can grow from trade unions
if rights of association and collective bargaining are granted. 93 Rights to
minimum wages, maximum hours, and other benefits can be expensive.
But in a surplus labor economy the price of labor will likely rise little
when adults take the place of children, so the prohibition of child labor
188 DAM, supra note 18, at 353-368.
189 See supra notes 133-139 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
191 Charnovitz, supra note 14.
192 See supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text.
193 TRADE'S HIDDEN CosTs, supra note 55.
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may cost less than other reforms.194 Third, the rationale behind the only
fair labor standard that is part of the GATT - the prohibition on the
sale of goods made with forced labor - is very like that of minimum age
requirements; workers unable to refuse the work must not be allowed to
enrich the employers who would pay them pennies and reap the competi-
tive advantage.195 Finally, nations pressed one at a time by the United
States implementation of the CLDA will not be able to thwart reform
through GATT procedures as is possible under section 301. Their refusal
to talk will not preserve the status quo; it will close their access to U.S.
markets.
It does not seem that the American citizens concerned about the
abuse of child labor abroad have any less right to representation by U.S
trade negotiators than do U.S. farmers,196 or U.S. service industries.1 9
This is particularly so if Congress has voted to elevate those concerns,
and to allow those citizens to petition the Secretary of Labor to identify
child labor offenders. Given the good reasons for a foreign nation to ca-
pitulate to U.S. child labor reform demands, the task of the USTR might
not be that difficult.
B. Private Parties
Provisions of the CLDA would allow a resistant foreign government
to be bypassed when the U.S. importer and the foreign supplier seek to
maintain a profitable relationship.1 9' Under this exception clause, the
U.S. importer may try to satisfy the Secretary that, though goods from
this particular foreign country are presumed to be made with child labor,
the goods purchased by this importer actually are not. 199 The Secretary's
promulgated rules must, however, require some real showing of compli-
194 GoTE HANSSON, SOCIAL CLAUSES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AN ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF LABOUR STANDARDS IN TRADE POLICY 169 (1983).
195 GATT, supra note 17, art. XX, § (e), states "nothing in this agreement shall be construed
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures.. .(e) relating to the
products of prison labour."
The U.S. does ban goods produced with prison labor, but the good imported must exactly
match a good verified as taken from a prison labor factory. Though U.S. Customs has difficulty
enforcing the ban because of these strict requirements, violations are still closely monitored.
196 See Paul R. Krugman, So Much for a New World Order, CLEVE. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 27,
1991, at 2E (farmers interests championed at GATT talks); Karen Tumulty, Nothing Short of a
Miracle Needed at Trade Talks, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1991, at D1 (U.S.T.R.'s demand for end to
subsidies for European farmers rejected by EC, provoking collapse of GATT Uruguay Round).
197 Clyde v. Prestowitz Jr. & Robert W. Jerome, GA TT's Not Where it's At, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
6, 1990, at A27 (stating that the U.S. has been preoccupied with bringing service industries and
agriculture within GATT).
198 H.R. 3786, supra note 6, § 5(b)(an importer can meet the exception test by documenting
the fact that "the article... satisfies the Secretary that the importer has undertaken reasonable steps
to ensure, to the extent practicable, that the article is not a product of child labor.").
199 Id.
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ance by the foreign importer, in order to give the CLDA teeth. The bur-
den must be on the importer to rebut the presumption that goods
exported from a country identified as failing to effectively enforce child
labor standards were produced by children.
To aid the American importer, the language of the bill as proposed
specifies sources of verification for the Secretary to use in classifying
countries, and stresses that, whenever possible, those same independent
sources should be used to identify industries within a particular foreign
country on the basis of their "commercial exploitation of children."2 "°
Import trade can involve more than just a foreign manufacturer and a
U.S. buyer; brokers, agents and distributors may stand between the U.S.
importer and the producers of the goods.2°" An American importer
could conceivably never have corresponded with her producer. Accord-
ingly, the Secretary's regulations should go further and require records of
all available information regarding the child labor practices of particular
manufacturers and mine operations. These records can be useful as part
of the Secretary's annual report and as the basis for consumer boycotts.
They will be invaluable as evidence to support a U.S. importer's claim
that she deserves to be granted an exception under CLDA section 5(b).
Compliance with strict documentation requirements of exception
clause regulations could be expensive, and might strain working relations
with agents and exporters used to being left to conduct their own busi-
ness. Where foreign exporters have alternate markets they may forego
dealing with American importers. Where the foreign exporter, however,
wants to continue trade with the U.S., and if he does not employ chil-
dren, it will be in his interest to provide reliable documentary, photo-
graphic, video, or testimonial evidence to his American trading partner
confirming the character of his work force. At the foreign exporter's sug-
gestion, the nearest representative of one of the reporting organizations
to which the Secretary turns for child labor information could visit the
foreign plant and certify the absence of child labor.
C. American Workers
Congressional Democrats had an issue in the ballooning trade deficit
of the 1980's; one on which they felt President Reagan was vulnerable.20 2
Increasing exports from less developed countries shocked Europeans and
Americans, who had dominated post-war trade unchallenged. 20 ' The
U.S. share of the world market in automobiles, semi-conductors, and ag-
200 Id. § 4(f).
201 HOWARD R. GOLDSMITH, IMPORT/EXPORT: A GUIDE TO GROWTH, PROFITS, AND MAR-
KET SHARE 125-26 (1989).
202 Phillips, supra note 147 at 502.
203 VERNON & SPAR, supra note 12, at 48-49.
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riculture shrank dramatically. 204 Calls for a level playing field in-
creased.20 5  Foreign nations were criticized for practicing "social
dumping:" selling goods that were in effect subsidized by the low wage
costs possible only when workers' rights are denied.206 In reality, U.S.
exports had held steady in the late seventies and early eighties.20 7 It was a
rush of imports in the early eighties that tipped the trade balance, im-
ports not the result of unfair trade practices but, according to the United
States Government Accounting Office, "overwhelmingly due to the rise
of the value of the U.S. dollar," and the fiscal deficit.208 Nevertheless,
proposed across-the-board tariff hikes appealed to a protectionist senti-
ment.20 9 Labor unions pressed for inclusion of worker rights provisions
in international agreements.210
The CLDA, insofar as it is based on the theory that children from
other countries are taking the jobs of Americans, appeals to the same
popular sentiment that flowered in the eighties.
Although there is evidence that juvenile labor is cheaper, 11 the pro-
hibition of child labor, nevertheless, may have little effect on the surplus
labor economy that many poorer nations endure. This is because wages
are already depressed, so the difference between a child's and an adult's
wage is slight, as is any consequent savings to the employer.212 In rare
full employment economies, or where adults can otherwise refuse the
lower wage, adults will leave other sectors, such as agriculture, to take
the manufacturing jobs that children are no longer allowed to perform.213
Minimum age standards, then, can raise the adult wage to the extent that
it takes more than one child to do the adult's work in the sector the adult
204 Id.
205 Bello & Homer, supra note 151, at 31-37.
206 Charnovitz, supra note 14, at 565.
207 VERNON & SPAR, supra note 12, at 47.
208 Richard Cooper, General Accounting Office, Symposium on the Causes of the US. Trade
Deficit 5; Microformed on GAO/NSIAD-87-135S, (1987).
209 Congressman Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo.) proposed an amendment to section 301 that
would mathematically identify nations that both (1) enjoyed excessive trade surpluses with the
United States and (2) engaged in unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory trade practices that
hurt the United States significantly. If bilateral negotiations could not remedy these situations, the
amendment required trade restrictions to an extent determined by the trade deficit that year. The
amendment was not passed. H.R. 4800, Section 119, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H3025
(daily ed. May 21, 1986).
210 TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 55. See also, Patrick McDonnell, Environmental
Fears Voiced on Free Trade Plan, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 24, 1991, at B1 (trade unions pressing for
international environmental standards in free trade agreements, to insure a level playing field).
211 See, eg., Issa Shivji, Law and Conditions of Child Labor in Colonial Tanganyika 1920-
1940, 13 ITr'L J. Soc. L. 221, 222-23 (1985); Moffett, supra note 2.
212 HANSSON, supra note 194.
213 Id.
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has abandoned.214
If elimination of child labor does raise the adult wage, will the incre-
ment be sufficient to level the field on which the United States and this
nation compete? There are other influences at work.215 Market forces
affect the business trying to stay afloat in an international market. For
example, a nation like Taiwan, with great numbers of young women ea-
ger to work for low wages in textile mills, once had cost advantages over
the United States without resorting to child labor.216 Already a signifi-
cant footwear producer, Taiwan's footwear exports to the United States
doubled from 1980 to 1989.117 Taiwan's U.S. sales of baby carriages,
toys, and games increased fourfold.218 With successful development has
come increases in wages and entitlements. 219 Now pressure to lower costs
persists.220 Pressure to improve skill and technology grows even in labor
intensive manufacturing such as textiles, where the international market
changes and quality must be controlled.221 The country therefore looks
to entirely new industries, such as electronics, imitating foreign products
and scrapping for technology of its own, again with adult labor.222
Taiwan, in this manner, has become less of a cheap labor threat to
the United States, but it is competitive in a new way, and the change had
nothing to do with children.223 The cheapest labor honors have been
passed to another country.
For example, Portugal once resisted modernization because its com-
petitive advantage lay in cheap labor, including the use of young children
in manufacturing. 24 Twin pressures of workers wanting a better living
standard and new manufacturing competitors with automated facilities
214 Id.
215 See Cooper, supra note 208, at 4-5.
216 See generally ILT Taiwan, 2 INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD:
TAIWAN (Bus. Int'l Corp.) 1, 17-19 (Sept. 1991).
217 OFFICE OF TRADE AND INV. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE INT'L TRADE ADMIN.
U.S. FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS 211 (1985); OFFICE OF TRADE AND INV. ANALYSIS, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS 215 (1990).
218 U.S. FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS (1990), supra note 217.
219 Id
220 Id. at 2.
221 Id.
222 See generally ILT Taiwan, supra note 216, at 2.
223 Cf South Korea, where the country's, "regimented work force is beginning to lift its collec-
tive head from the conveyor belt and live a little ..... According to the Labor Minister, the
Korean work week has fallen from 51.1 to 46.3 hours in three years. Service sector employment has
grown 6.1% and Deputy Prime Minister Choi Kak Kyu says that government policy is directed at,
"developing high technology in core industries and producing technically trained workers to pro-
duce high-value products." South Koreans Start to Work Less, Buy More, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1991,
at D3.
224 Patrick Blum, Portugal Fears Textiles Will Fall Victim to GATT Deal, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
16, 1990, at 7.
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weakened Portugal's once secure advantage to the point that even child
labor does not offer savings sufficient to allow it to compete.225 Thus, it is
not as simple as claiming children are taking American jobs. Still poorer
nations may undercut any nation, encouraging it to compete efficiently in
more sophisticated goods, goods such as electronics, goods children can-
not produce.226
Only to the extent, then, that a foreign nation has a full employment
economy, sees adult manufacturing wages rise due to a minimum work-
ing age requirement, and remains in the same market and mode of pro-
duction once wage costs change, can a bill like the CLDA cause the
prices of imports to the United States to rise, making American produ-
cers more competitive and thus preserving jobs for American workers.227
To this limited extent, the CLDA might also prevent the flight of
American capital to foreign markets that offer cheap labor.228 Recent
U.S. policy, however, has not supported permanent protection of work-
ers whose jobs disappear because production facilities move to foreign
countries.229 Labor unions have opposed the U.S. policy, but the U.S.
response to industrial flight has focused on worker adjustment and re-
training rather than rigid constraints on capital, preferring to let market
forces dictate investment.230 It is doubtful that the slight economic effect
of the CLDA could protect workers when declared U.S. policy is to the
contrary.
225 Id
226 See generally ILT Taiwan, supra note 216, at 2.
227 In some cases, costs of meeting the section 5(b) exception requirements, proving that one's
foreign trade partner was not exporting goods made with child labor, could also increase prices.
228 See Products from Mexico Occupy Center Stage at GSP Subcommittee Annual Review Hear-
ings, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. 1258 (1989) (U.S. glass plants closing because cheaper Mexican labor
available); Levi Strauss to Close Texas Plant, Shift Production to Offshore Contractor, 7 INT'L TRADE
REP. 125 (1990) (to reduce costs, Levi Strauss closes San Antonio sewing facility, shifts operations to
Caribbean); Bob Baker, Exported Jobs Drive Home Grim Lesson in Economics, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13,
1991 at Al (Green Giant broccoli packaging lays off 375 $7.50/hr. workers, shifts jobs to Mexican
plant where workers earn $4.00/day).
229 William R. Kline, U.S. Trade and Industrial Policy: The Experience of Textiles, Steel and
Automobiles in STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 211, 216
(Paul R. Krusman ed., 1986). See also United Steel Workers Local 1330 v. US. Steel, 631 F. 2d 1264
(6th Cir. 1980) (denying common law remedy for workers who were victims of plant closing).
230 Worker Dislocation, Capital Flight and Plant Closings: Hearings on H.R. 2847 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. 56 (1983) (statement of William Winpisinger, International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers, deploring the "sovereignty of capital" and demanding due process
through hearing process when plants close); Id at 88 (statement of William H. Bywater, President
of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, arguing that
capital looks only at labor cost, and that notice of plant closings should be provided).
Notice of plant closings is required in the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-379, § 3, 102 Stat. 890, 891-92 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2102).
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D. Foreign Children
The CLDA procedure calls for the Secretary of Labor to use a
number of authorities when deciding if a country condones child labor,
whether by law or in practice.231 The Secretary would therefore be free to
disregard ineffective child labor laws. She could make her determination
based on what the country does, not on what it says. If this is the case,
however, a great many nations will fail to pass the test.
Even the United States, by some reckoning, might fail to show that
it has taken sufficient steps to eliminate child labor. Minimum working
age is mandated in the Fair Labor Standards Act and in some state stat-
utes, but recent investigations by the General Accounting Office show the
laws are much abused and their enforcement underfunded.232 The Fair
Labor Standards Act doesn't apply to small businesses and some states
have less restrictive standards. With children of the post-war baby boom
now adults, there are fewer 15 to 18 year olds available for service and
fast food jobs, so employers are tempted to hire 12, 13, and 14 year old
children. It can be argued that this is not mining or manufacturing, but
abuses occur in those industries as well, and, regardless of the industry,
the point is that in the United States, just as in foreign countries, legisla-
tion alone has not cured abuses of child labor.233
Italy, similarly, has laws prohibiting child labor, but inspectors "see
their job as little more than a pointless game. '234 Even if Italian violators
are discovered among the maze of small, scattered work places, they find
it easy to move and restart business under a different name. Further, as
noted above, family needs demand child labor.23 The impoverished par-
ents of these children are eager to see their child employed.236
The Secretary's determination should reflect reality in each country,
but to keep from choking off imported goods altogether it will have to
depend on some practical analysis similar to the "taking steps to im-
prove" tests used in the CBI and OPIC programs. Completely hollow
foreign legislation, devoid of enforcement procedures or funding, should
231 H.R. 3786 supra note 6, at § 4(f) (the Secretary is to use all available information from the
ILO, children's advocacy organizations, trade unions, religious and human rights organizations).
232 The General Accounting Office's recent investigation shows child labor violations growing
from 10,000 in 1893 to 25,000 in 1989. Beth Baker, Kids at Work, COMMON CAUSE MAGAZINE,
July/Aug. 1990, at 11.
233 An amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act recently increased fines for violators of the
minimum age provisions from $1,000 to $10,000. Omnibus Budget Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
508, § 3103, 104 Stat. 1388 (1991) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C., § 216(e)).
234 VrrrACHI, supra note 60.
235 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 94; Tafadzwa Matimba, Children: Abuse Has Many
Faces, INT'L PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 25, 1990 (Zimbabwe parents expect children to work); MARINA
VALCARENGHI, CHILD LABOUR IN ITALY 14 (1981) (poor families, rural and urban, force offspring
to work).
236 VALCARENGHI, supra note 235.
Vol. 24:631
TOWARD INTERNATIONAL FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
not be considered a real ban on child labor. On the other hand, propo-
nents should realize that the test specified in the bill, requiring that a
nation be "effectively enforcing" a child labor law, will not be a useful
reform tool if it sets an impossible standard.2 37 The United States cer-
tainly cannot hold foreign trading partners to higher standards than it
sets for itself.
Agriculture, street business, and domestic service employ most of
the working children in the world.238 Domestic servants apprentice in
Haiti at the age of six.2 39 In one Argentine province eighty-eight percent
of children ten to thirteen years old work on cotton plantations.' 4 The
CLDA, and the trend toward automation, may encourage lesser use of
child labor in manufacturing, but it will not end the children's labor in
agriculture and services, where the youngsters risk injury from danger-
ous machinery and exposure.2 4 ' As the ILO reports, poverty is the over-
riding cause of child labor.2 42 Parents are forced to send the child to
work, or have the child help them in their work. In many rural areas no
educational facilities exist to even pose an alternative.243 Even when edu-
cational facilities do exist, most parents in this situation will choose to
have the child work.2 " Only the strictest domestic legislation in each
foreign country could overcome these pressing needs and lack of alterna-
tive activities. The CLDA does target the most dangerous industries, but
it cannot eliminate child labor.
VIII. CONCLUSION
If the Secretary does accurately list foreign countries on the basis of
their actual control of child labor and if each American importer is re-
quired to verify the written contract with his foreign supplier, the CLDA
might succeed in changing foreign practices through private and national
contacts. The U.S. market does work as an incentive. Nonreciprocal pro-
grams and negotiations based on section 301 violations have shown this
to be the case. The Secretary of Labor's published reports could also aid
consumer and human rights groups campaigning against child labor.
Each nation's domestic legislation to ban child labor, however, will only
change practice to the extent it is enforced.
If stringent guidelines are not followed, the CLDA's strength will be
strictly symbolic. This is not to suggest that symbolism, or the CLDA,
237 H.R. 3786 supra note 6, at § 4(d)(2)(A).
238 DEPARTMENT OF STATE supra note 94.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Kucherov, supra note 96, at 44-45.
242 Uniyal, supra note 5.
243 Kucherov, supra note 96, at 45.
244 SUMANTA BANERJEE, CHILD LABOR IN THAILAND 22 (1980).
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are worthless. Symbolism may be the realistic goal of the CLDA. It can-
not right the trade imbalance. It may affect wage levels only in some
economies. Foreign children will continue to work long hours on farms
and as domestic servants even if it becomes law. A nation that does not
need U.S. markets is likely to challenge the CLDA's prohibitions under
the GATT.
The CLDA does assert a new international principle. It calls for a
minimum age standard to be added to the GAIT. It urges a world wide
ban on the products of child labor through the United Nations.245 The
bill does not demand the full range of international fair labor standards
included in section 301, or hinted at in the GSP program. Foreign na-
tions are not asked to set a minimum wage, or to permit the formation of
labor unions, with the threatening political power such organizations can
gather. Foreign nations are asked merely to cease the use of young chil-
dren in certain industries.
A minimum age requirement for work in factories will not be as
great a sacrifice as other fair labor standards. Sophisticated techniques
and automation already limit the use of children in large scale manufac-
turing. Stories of abused children in their own countries may also make
trading partners and government officials abroad more accommodating.
If they are not asked to give up too much, and their compassion softens
indifference, then they may acquiesce to U.S. assertions of a new interna-
tional principle in order to maintain profitable relations. Instead of press-
ing all recognized fair labor standards in a frozen multilateral forum, the
CLDA picks one that threatens the least and presses it gently, one na-
tion, one employer at a time.
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245 CLDA, supra note 6, at 3786, § 3.
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